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August 26, 2015
Testing macro models
This lecture is about whether and how we can test the macro-economic mod-
els that we use for policy. My colleague and co-author, Mike Wickens, gave a
lecture at the MMF last year in which he explained how times had changed in
the treatment of macro-economic models. Once upon a time large-scale econo-
metric models were estimated and tested by classical econometric methods. But
then the arrival of rational expectations and Lucas critique meant that we did
not trust them for policy-making any more because their parameters were those
of aggregate supply and demand curves, which would change with changing
policy regimes. The next two decades were spent building micro-founded mod-
els whose parameters were thought to be structural. However, when estimated
and tested by the classical methods, these models were generally rejected- in
a famous quotation from Sargent Lucas and Prescott told me we were reject-
ing too many good models. There followed two decades or so, lasting until
today, where many macromodels were calibrated and compared informally with
stylised facts. More recently, Bayesian estimation has brought these models
closer to the data, using the calibrated values as priors. But Bayesians make no
claims about these models testability in the classical sense; rather they treat
all models as false and evaluate di¤erent models probability.
However, for policymakers this situation, I will argue, is quite unsatisfactory.
They would like to know whether the macro models they are using for policy
analysis are good enough for this purpose. They would not reject Lucas critique:
their models must contain only structural parameters, that therefore are not
a¤ected by the policies they are thinking about. It is for this reason we and they
use DSGE models whose parameters we can reasonably claim are structural.
But how are we to choose between the many di¤erent DSGE models on
o¤er? Everyone here is familiar with the di¤erent schools of thought one meets
I am grateful to my colleagues and coworkers, Mai Le, David Meenagh, Mike Wickens
and Yongdeng Xu, for the substantive issues that this lecture reviews, all of it based on
work done with some or all of them. Details of this work are of course to be found in the
numerous references in Le et al, 2015, on which this lecture is based. I am also grateful for
their comments on and contributions to this lecture.
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in macroeconomics- Keynesian, freshwater, Austrian, the list goes on. Since
the Great Recession crisis others have been added, with many on the fringes of
the subject claiming that it has totally failed and we should go back to ad hoc
models built on insights from economic history. This would violate the Lucas
Critique and so is a counsel of despair. So what are we to do, faced with this
plethora of theories?
There are those who would say: create an unchallengeable theory to which
all will then subscribe. We are clearly many miles away from being able to do
that. Indeed that was the ambition of the Real Business Cycle theorists thirty
years ago. Yet today we face even more disagreement than then.
The Bayesians would say we cannot really judge between them because they
are all wrong and so we can come up with some probabilities of each being right.
But if one is a policy maker this means that you still have no idea how your
policy will turn out since these models contradict each other dramatically. You
might succeed very well or fail utterly. So this approach is not much use to you.
So I suggest we need to test these models against the data in the hope that
some will be eliminated and one will emerge as closest to the data. This one
would then be the survivor in Poppers sense, to go on to be tested on later
data. As a policymaker you can then put your faith in this model and think
about how your policies will work, condent you have the causal mechanism of
their transmission.
In this lecture I am going to explain how one can do this for macro models
with a substantial amount of power to reject false models so that when you
nd the model you do not reject you can have good condence it is close to the
true model for the purposes you have in mind. A group of us at Cardi¤ have
developed these methods so that we can now give anyone a programme that
will carry them out for a wide range of models. These methods have been made
possible by modern computing capacity. Even ten years ago they would have
been too time-consuming to apply. Of course for most of my career we had no
decent tools to evaluate models in toto; it is really for this reason that there
is so much ongoing controversy about models. There has never been a way to
settle disputes by going to the data.
Many of you will be familiar with Likelihood Ratio tests and will perhaps
protest that it has been possible to carry these out with existing programmes
for some time. This is true. But there are two advantages in the methods we
propose over Likelihood Ratio tests. The rst is that our method has much
more power. The second is that it can be focused on the purposes you want the
model for in a way that the Likelihood Ratio test cannot; thus the latter test
asks how close the model gets to the data, all the data, for a set of variables,
whereas the test we propose asks how close the model gets to the behaviour of
a set of variables in particular respects, such as over the business cycle or in its
growth aspect. Policymakers want models that capture such behaviour and do
not care if they do not capture other behaviour. They want to nd a model for
policy purposes that is both consistent with the relevant features of the data
and also has good power against poor policy outcomes. We will see later how
our methods get them closest to this objective.
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In this point we encounter what I will call the Friedman utility of tests.
You may recall that Friedman in his 1953 paper on methodology argued that we
should test models, not on their literal truth, but on their ability to explain the
data features we designed them to explain- the ones we were interested in and
concerned about. A model was, he said, an as if construct, not meant to be
literally true but to capture some essential aspects of behaviour by assumptions
that could mimic that behaviour as if it was true. He had in mind that idea that
models were gross simplications of or abstractions from reality, constructed
to have explanatory power, by which is meant getting a lot of explanation
from as simple a construct as possible. Critical to this approach is the choice
of the aspects of reality to be explained. Many economists are familiar with
Likelihood as the yardstick; but of course this is the likelihood of the model
tting just one aspect of reality, namely the likelihood of observing the data
conditional on the model. E¤ectively this tests whether the model is close to
the data in a forecasting sense; the measure is based on the reduced form errors
of the model. However a macro policymaker wanting to make good new policy-
assumed in this lecture to be the arbiter of taste- is not interested in forecasting
performance but rather in whether the model behaves causally like the real
world, by which we mean the likelihood of the behaviour of key macro variables
in the data conditional on the model. Since that data behaviour is the reduced
form of the model (or an approximation to it), we are checking whether the
models reduced form parameters, which are functions of the models causal
structure, are close to the datas. Such a correspondence implies the models
causal structure cannot be rejected as the one generating the data. It is this
correspondence that is tested for in Indirect Inference, where we use a Wald-
type statistic (an IIW) to measure the gap between what the model says the
data behaviour should be and what the data behaviour actually is. For this we
usually use the data behaviour as described by the estimated VAR coe¢cients
of the data.
This distinction matters a lot in practice. Di¤erent aspects of reality being
tested yield di¤erent results for the tests of models. The gure below shows the
scatter diagram of Data Likelihood (measured by the Likelihood Ratio of the
model to an unrestricted VAR) versus Data Behaviour likelihood (measured by
the IIW on the VAR coe¢cients) for Monte Carlo samples from the SW model.
The correlation is 0.008, or essentially zero! This means that had you rejected
your true DSGE model on an LR test, you would have been almost certain not
to reject it on an IIW test; and vice versa. As the model you are testing becomes
more False the test results become slightly more correlated. But even when the
model is 10% False they give signicantly di¤erent results as can be seen from
the next diagram, which plots the scatters up to 20% False. The saving grace is
that once your model becomes this False, both tests reject it much of the time.
But the problem for you as a policymaker is that the success of your policies
may depend on the model being much less false than this in terms of your key
yardstick.
Another yardstick that has become familiar is Impulse Response Functions;
these too could be used to create an IIW. For example if you are on the MPC
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you will be concerned that your monetary impulse has the desired e¤ects; this
yardstick is related to the VAR coe¢cient yardstick above but is specialised
di¤erently in terms of shock and variables a¤ected. If you use it you must be
careful to use the joint distribution over the IRFs involved and not evaluate
them separately.
What this discussion should reveal is that this is similar to the idea of com-
paring DSGE models simulated behaviour with stylised facts. The di¤erence
lies in the use of the models joint distribution over these stylised facts rather
than informally deciding whether the group of facts each are close to the sim-
ulated facts. But the basic idea of this comparison in e¤ect revives Friedmans
ideas about testing, putting the facts that interest the user centre stage in the
test.
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Figure 1: Scatter Plots of Indirect Inference (Wald, horizontal axis) v. Direct
Inference (LR, vertical exis) for 1000 samples of True Model (3 Variable VAR(1))
The methods we have developed are based on and organised around Indirect
Inference. This originated with the work of Tony Smith (1993) as an estimation
technique for non-linear models where the data behaviour is described in some
purely descriptive way, the most usual being a VAR or in the case of non-
stationary data a VECM. This description is known as an auxiliary model.
Then the model being estimated, which in our case here is a structural DSGE
model, is simulated by bootstrapping to enable its predictions for the auxiliary
model to be compared with the one found in the data; in estimation the model
parameters are varied until the simulated auxiliary model is as close as possible
to the one in the data and in testing the auxiliary model coe¢cients estimated on
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the data are located in the simulated models distribution of them, with rejection
if they come outside the critical boundary. As already noted the methods can be
exibly focused on whatever features of the data behaviour the user is concerned
to explain. In e¤ect the method asks, via the IIW, whether this DSGE model
could statistically be the one generating the facts of behaviour we observe. But
this is just the starting point for examining the policymakers model; they also
need to know how sure they can be about the model they have at the end of
this estmation and testing process. For this they need to discover the power
of their test by Monte Carlo experiment; and then check how vulnerable they
could be to model mis-specication.
In the rest of this lecture I will describe how we apply this to the widely-used
Smets-Wouters model, discuss the power of the method and compare it to some
alternatives, and end by reviewing some of the ndings we have made so far
about macro models.
1 The concept of test power
Once one has decided to test a model in a certain respect, the question then
arises of how powerful the test is. This means what percentage of the time
(i.e with what probability) will it reject false models in small samples- small
because these are the ones we encounter in macro-modelling. We can establish
this percentage by replicating the test across many repeated samples. The test
is set up (i.e its critical value chosen) so that it will reject the True model at the
chosen condence level, so if at 95% then it will reject 5% of the time. This is
the size of the test. Having chosen the size we can then ask how the rejection
rate rises as the model becomes more and more false. The faster this rises with
falseness the higher the power of the test.
We could of course ask whether the model can pass a test of mirroring all data
behaviour according the fullest possible detailed descriptive VAR. For example
the SW model has a reduced form for 7 variables which is a VAR(4) and has
196 coe¢cients. So if one uses a 7-variable-VAR(4) as the auxiliary model for
the SW case we are asking whether the SW models simulated reduced form is
like the data-based reduced form it would have. This is a very demanding test
and no model is likely to come anywhere near passing it. If one assumes the
SW model is true then the power of the test is massive; even a 1% degree of
falseness leads to 100% rejection.
But users really do not care whether the SW model can get all aspects of
reality exactly right, especially as they know they will never nd such a model.
Instead users care about specic aspects of reality. So we could ask whether the
SW model captures the data behaviour very approximately (say by a VAR1) of
three key macro variables, output, ination and interest rates. Then the test
concentrates on the minimum practical requirements of the user and makes it
possible for the user to nd a model that gives what is needed. What users
would then like is for the test to reject frequently any models that are false to a
degree likely to abort their policy changes. How false would that be? We would
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need to experiment with the policy changes and the tolerances of the policy
maker to judge this. But we might say for illustration that a policymaker could
well tolerate a falseness in the models structure of up to 5%. Then a rejection
rate at or above the 50-70% range at this level of falseness could well provide
some security in choosing a model that passes the test.
What I am trying to describe is a practical procedure for a user to choose
a model. Users must discover the tolerance of falseness they can live with, and
then they can proceed to discover whether their test will deliver a model that
reliably delivers better than that tolerance level- which means it has high power
above that falseness level. The toolkit of indirect inference does this job, we
believe.
2 An insurrection in testing
The test we are proposing is an unfamiliar type of Wald test, in which we
compare the estimates of a VAR on the data with the estimates we would get
from the DSGE model when simulated. Statisticians among you will know
that a standard Wald test of the distance between an unrestricted parameter
estimate and a restricted one is derivable from a Likelihood Ratio test between
the unrestricted and the restricted model- essentially they are the same test.
How then is it possible for our Wald-type test to have more power than a
Likelihood Ratio test?
One reason lies in the way the two tests are carried out in practice. When
an LR test is done, it is usual to reestimate at the least the error process in
the model to bring them on track. This is not usually done with a Wald
test. Unfortunately by bringing the model on track it does articially better in
forecasting the data and this greatly reduces the power of the LR test.
We can put health warnings on LR tests to avoid doing this. Yet even then
the Wald-type test, the IIW, we propose has greater power. Let me illustrate
this from the Smets- Wouters model:
7
VAR  no of coe¤s TRUE 1% 3% 5% 7% 10% 15% 20%
DIRECT INFERENCE
2 variable VAR(1)  4 5:0 12:0 28:3 45:9 63:4 83:2 97:0 99:7
3 variable VAR(1)  9 5:0 9:4 21:8 37:5 58:9 84:0 99:0 100:0
3 variable VAR(2)  18 5:0 8:9 20:7 36:8 57:6 82:9 98:7 100:0
3 variable VAR(3)  27 5:0 8:9 20:4 36:7 56:7 82:2 98:7 100:0
5 variable VAR(1)  25 5:0 8:9 22:4 44:3 68:6 89:6 99:6 100:0
7 variable VAR(3)  147 5:0 5:7 10:6 23:6 46:3 83:2 99:6 100:0
INDIRECT INFERENCE with unrestricted covariance matrix
2 variable VAR(1)  4 5:0 6:2 20:3 69:6 61:0 99:8 100:0 100:0
3 variable VAR(1)  9 5:0 3:4 7:5 30:7 75:0 97:4 100:0 100:0
3 variable VAR(2)  18 5:0 3:8 5:2 19:1 57:5 84:3 98:4 99:5
3 variable VAR(3)  27 5:0 3:9 6:4 21:6 54:5 84:0 97:5 98:7
5 variable VAR(1)  25 5:0 2:8 3:2 2:6 5:4 6:2 4:5 100:0
7 variable VAR(3)  147 5:0 5:1 3:4 1:4 0:9 0:2 0:0 100:0
INDIRECT INFERENCE with restricted covariance matrix
2 variable VAR(1)  4 5:0 9:8 37:7 80:8 96:8 100:0 100:0 100:0
3 variable VAR(1)  9 5:0 9:5 36:1 71:0 98:1 100:0 100:0 100:0
3 variable VAR(2)  18 5:0 8:3 35:5 80:9 96:9 100:0 100:0 100:0
3 variable VAR(3)  27 5:0 9:2 32:9 78:0 95:1 100:0 100:0 100:0
5 variable VAR(1)  25 5:0 17:8 85:5 99:8 100:0 100:0 100:0 100:0
7 variable VAR(3)  147 5:0 77:6 99:2 100:0 100:0 100:0 100:0 100:0
Comparison
of rejection rates at 95% level for Indirect Inference and Direct Inference
These tables show that at say 5% falseness the power of the test doubles
compared with the LR test and also compared with the standard Wald test.
It turns out the reason is that our Wald-type test makes the DSGE model
being tested the null hypothesis whereas the standard Wald test makes the
unknown true model embodied in the data the null. This is an important
di¤erence because we do not know what the true model is; hence to nd out
the distribution of the VAR coe¢cients it implies we must use the estimates we
have from the data. We nd this by bootstrapping the data-based VAR- ie the
estimates we got from unrestricted estimation of the VAR on the data. Call
this the Unrestricted distribution. What this is doing is reestimating the VAR
on new bootstrap data, created each time by redrawing the VAR innovations.
By contrast when we use the DSGE model being tested as the null, we boot-
strap its own innovations (which we back out of the data) and simulate the
model with all its restrictions every time. The resulting bootstrap samples re-
ect not just the di¤erent innovations but also the e¤ects of these innovations
when interacted with the models restrictions; the latter generates data which
will produce di¤erent VAR coe¢cients in each sample, in its own right- the Un-
restricted model always uses the same (estimated) VAR coe¢cients to generate
the bootstrap data1 . We then estimate the implied VAR coe¢cients. Call the
1This can be seen formally by noting that the  coe¢cients reestimated from the ith
bootstrap of the unrestricted VAR (found from the T data sample) are:
bUNRi = fOLSfby
UNR
i
= byUNR
i
[bT (; T ); i]g
where  is the vector of structural model coe¢cients (including those of the error processes),
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distribution of these the Restricted distribution. The di¤erence between the
Restricted and Unrestricted distributions lies in the way the Restricted uses
the models own restrictions to generate the bootstrap samples while the Unre-
stricted uses the estimated VAR coe¢cients. Another way of putting it is that
the Restricted distribution has a variance matrix of the VAR coe¢cients derived
from the DSGE model whereas the Unrestricted has one derived from the data
sample VAR estimates.
We illustrate the situation in the following two diagrams.
What we show in the rst set of graphs below (Figure 3) are two distribu-
tions for 2 VAR coe¤s taken from a 3-variable VAR1 for the SW model: the two
are the ownlag coe¢cients for the short-term interest rate and for ination.
We generate one sample from the SW model. We then estimate the 3VAR1
coe¢cients on that true data sample, and we nd the distribution for the two
coe¢cients above by bootstrapping the VAR innovations. We then nd the same
distribution when restricted by the True model, by bootstrapping the structural
innovations generating that sample. The graphs below show the densities of
the joint distribution of the two coe¢cients. What one observes is that the
restricted distribution is both smaller in size and also more elliptical than the
unrestricted when the model is true. We then falsify the model structural para-
meters (including the error AR coe¢cients) by 5% and 10%; now we bootstrap
the same structural innovations and nd the resulting (restricted) distributions
for the two VAR coe¢cients. As the model becomes more False the restricted
distributions become more elliptical and their variance rises; they also rotate
somewhat as the covariance changes. Notice that when the model is False but
still close to the True the restricted distribution is both more elliptical and has
lower variance than the unrestricted. Both features give it more power at low
Falseness as can be seen from the next graph.
The second graph, Figure 4, shows how this impacts on the Wald tests
power when testing a model that is 5% False. We are looking down from above
on the true distribution of the two VAR coe¢cients, generated by Monte Carlo
means from the True model using its true structural innovations and parameters;
 the vector of structural innovations,  that of VAR innovations, fOLS is the OLS estimator
function to obtain the  from the y.
Now compare the analogous estimates with restricted VAR bootstraps:
bRESi = fOLSfby
RES
i
= byRES
i
[; i] = by
RES
i
[bi(; i); i]g
We can see that these  OLS estimates come from y simulated directly from the structural
model and that these in turn have a VAR representation consisting of two elements, the direct
e¤ect of  as before plus the indirect e¤ect of ;  on . It is this last extra element that
creates the rich variation in resampled data behaviour reecting the DSGE models structure
interacting with the structural errors.
In terms of the example discussed below in the text where we consider the own-persistence
VAR parameters of ination and interest rates, what is happening is that with restricted boot-
straps model-simulated samples in which ination is not persistent will typically also be those
where interest rates are also not persistent, and vice versa, because the model implies a strong
connection between the two variables; thus estimated covariation in these own-persistence
VAR parameters (bi(; i)) will show up in the resampled data. With unrestricted bootstraps
this covariation is not included; instead the VAR parameters generating the data are held
constant at those in the data sample, bT (; T ). Notice that the variation due to the direct
e¤ect of the innovations, i, is the same in both cases.
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this distribution therefore shows the true sample population. The green dot in
the Figure shows the mean of two VAR coe¢cients implied by the 5% False
model. We can now test this False model two ways on a given data sample.
One way involves taking that samples unrestricted VAR1 representation and
bootstrapping it; an example of the 5% contour of such a bootstrap distribution
is given by the dashed green line. The thick green line shows the frontier at
which the 5% False model is just rejected by the data samples on the line; in
e¤ect along it we are recentering the same dashed green line. Now consider the
red ellipse. This shows the 5% contour of the False model distribution, using
the same True innovations.
The two ways of testing the False model give di¤erent rejection rates. The
data samples to the left of the thick green line are those that reject the False
model under the rst method- where we use the Unrestricted distribution from
the data. The data samples to the left of the red ellipse are those that reject the
False model under the second method- where we use the False model Restricted
distribution. Plainly the second method gives much greater power. Essentially
we are illustrating here what happens when we use the SW model in a Monte
Carlo example below (we have assumed for the illustration that the power in
respect of these two VAR coe¢cients is the same as for the whole set of VAR
coe¢cients tested below); there we nd that the power roughly doubles as we
move from method 1 to method 2 at 5% Falseness.
We can also look at the third Figure to see how the rotation of the ellipse
due to the changing covariance of the two VAR coe¢cients can raise the power
of the IIW test. As the ellipse rotates, it covers less and less of the True model
sample points. Thus not just the distance of the models mean VAR coe¢cients
from the True mean of the data-based ones but also the shape of the models
distribution for these coe¢cients and its rotation (both due to the model-implied
covariance between the coe¢cients) with rising falseness determine the power
of the test- i.e. how many of the data sample points it fails to cover. With the
standard UNR Wald the shape and rotation is xed regardless of Falseness- one
is always using the same distribution based on the True data sample- and so
only the distance varies with Falseness.
Why would eminent statisticians not have seen this helpful increase in power
from this non-standard use of the Wald? I think there may be three reasons.
First, asympotically there is no di¤erence between the IIW and the standard
Unrestricted Wald when the model is True; this is a small-sample result and this
has not typically been a focus for statisticians because analytic results cannot be
obtained for small samples. Second, the Restricted distribution can only prac-
tically be obtained by the bootstrapping methods used here and these methods
have not been popular with statisticians at least until quite recently, whereas
the conventional Wald distribution can be obtained by the usual asymptotic
methods- the variance matrix is estimated along with the VAR on the data
sample. Third, because as we have noted there is a power trade-o¤ between
the variance and the restrictions, e¤ectively between the diagonal and the o¤-
diagonal elements in the variance matrix: statisticians may well have assumed
that the diagonal elements were the more important.
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Figure 3: Figure 3: Restricted VAR and Unrestricted VAR Coe¢cient Distrib-
utions
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Rejection Frontier
5% False (unrestricted)
Figure 4: Two 95% contours for tests of 5% False Model- Green=Unrestricted;
Red=Restricted.
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False parameters  rotate False model coeffic ients
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Figure 5: Joint Distribution of VAR coe¢cients rotates with changing False
DSGE parameters
If we were asked why we discovered the higher-power of the non-standard
Wald test, our reply would have be that it it came out of a long process of
investigation. We began with a Friedman-style approach to testing in which we
explored the distributions implied by the model. This led on to our results and
comparisons with other methods. Finally we managed to work out why we were
getting these results.
Exploiting the extra power of the Wald-type test with DSGE-model-
restricted variance matrix Thus when we eliminate the di¤erence in proce-
dures and test like-for-like we found the two tests are reasonably comparable in
power when the indirect inference test is performed using the unrestricted Wald
test which uses the variance of the unrestricted VAR (auxiliary) model. This
turns out to be because the tests are approximately equivalent on a like-for-like
basis. However, we showed above that extra power is delivered by the IIW test
set out here, under which the DSGE model being tested is treated as the null
hypothesis: in this case the Wald statistic uses the variance restricted by the
DSGE model under test. This gives this restricted Wald test still greater power.
It may be possible to raise the power of the Wald test further. We suggest
two ways this might be achieved:
1) extending the Wald test to include elements of the variance matrix of the
coe¢cients of the auxiliary model;
2) including more of the structural models variables in the VAR, increasing
the order of the VAR, or both.
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The basic idea here is to extend the features of the structural model that the
auxiliary model seeks to match. The former is likely to increase the power of
the restricted Wald test, but not the LR test, as this last can only ask whether
the DSGE model is forecasting su¢ciently accurately; including more variables
is likely to increase the power of both. There is, of course, a limit to the
number of features of the DSGE model that can be included in the test. If,
for example, we employ the full model then we run into the objection raised by
Lucas and Prescott against tests of DSGE models that "too many good models
are being rejected by the data". The point is that the model may o¤er a good
explanation of features of interest but not of other features of less interest, and it
is the latter that results in the rejection of the model by conventional hypothesis
tests. Focusing on particular features is a major strength of the Wald test.
3-equation NK model  no lags (VAR(1) reduced form)
Rejection rates at 95% condence: T=200
3 variable VAR(1) 3 variable VAR(2)
True 5:0 5:0
1% 4:9 4:3
3% 7:3 7:1
5% 16:1 21:7
7% 37:0 40:3
10% 73:3 76:3
15% 99:4 99:8
20% 100:0 100:0
Table 1: Comparing power due to VAR order (3-equation NK model with no
lags)
Consider now including an indexing lag in the Phillips Curve. This increases
the number of structural parameters to 9 and the reduced-form solution is a
VAR(2). The power of the Wald test is reported in Table 2. Increasing the
number of lags in the auxiliary model has clearly raised the power of the test.
This additional power is related to the identication of the structural model.
The more over-identied the model, the greater the power of the test. Adding
an indexation lag has increased the number of over-identifying restrictions ex-
ploitable by the reduced form. A DSGE model that is under-identied would
produce the same reduced-form solution for di¤erent values of the unidenti-
ed parameters and would, therefore have zero power for tests involving these
parameters.
In practice, most DSGE models will be over-identied- see Le et al (2013). In
particular, the SW model is highly over-identied. The reduced form of the SW
model is approximately a 7VAR(4) which has 196 coe¢cients. Depending on the
version used, the SW model has around 15 (estimatable) structural parameters
and around 10 ARMA parameters. The 196 coe¢cients of the VAR are all
non-linear functions of the 25 model parameters, indicating a high degree of
over-identication.
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3-equation NK model  with lag (VAR(2) reduced form)
Rejection rates at 95% condence: T=200
3 variable VAR(1) 3 variable VAR(2)
True 5:0 5:0
1% 10:6 6:0
3% 20:7 19:5
5% 47:5 57:9
7% 65:6 91:2
10% 89:6 100:0
15% 98:8 100:0
20% 99:9 100:0
Table 2: Comparing power due to VAR order (3-equation NK model with in-
dexing lag)
The over-identifying restrictions may also a¤ect the variance matrix of the
reduced-form errors. If true, these extra restrictions may be expected to produce
more precise estimates of the coe¢cients of the auxiliary model and thereby
increase its power. It also suggests that the power of the test may be further
increased by using these variance restrictions to provide further features to be
included in the test.
3 Our methods in practice
I have argued so far that the IIW method described here enables economists
with a particular purpose- I have taken it to be policy formation- to nd a model
that generates the sort of behaviour of interest to them. By focusing the test
narrowly on this behaviour these economists can nd a model that passes the
test and then can be condent that the test would have rejected the model if it
was more than x% False, where x is quite low. They can then explore whether
this Falseness tolerance satises their objectives; In other words they can see
whether a model with this degree of Falseness would have potentially misled
them or not for their purposes. If x% False is good enough, then they have a
model they can use.
They can get this combination of power and focus from the method by
deciding carefully the features of interest to them. If they make the focus too
broad, then the tests power will be huge but they will never nd a model to
pass. But with a narrow but suitable focus the power will remain large enough
to keep the x% falseness low.
When we look around at the practice of such economists today- eg at central
banks- we nd that typically either they use no tests at all or they may use
standard likelihood or related out-of-sample forecasting tests. These have low
power, especially given the way they are implemented in practice; and so the
users can only know condently that they would reject at high Falseness levels.
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But these may well be too high for them to have any condence in the policy
results.
In the remainder of this talk I am going to discuss the results we have found
in using the Smets-Wouters model for monetary and scal policy purposes in
the context of the recent crisis and its aftermath (Le et al, 2014). This work
is all on US data for the period since the mid-1980s; we have not found it
possible to mimic US behaviour for earlier data, we think because there has
been substantial regime change before then- Le et al (2011, 2014).
I start from the position that the model has credible micro-foundations but
that we are searching for a variant of it that a) can allow for a banking system
with the monetary base (M0) as an input into it b) can integrate the zero
bound on the risk-free interest rate and QE/bank regulation as policy tools;
and c) can explain the behaviour of the three key macro variables: output,
ination and interest rates. This is because we want to nd a model within which
we can reliably explore policies that would improve these variables behaviour,
especially their crisis behaviour. There is of course a large macro literature in
which claims are made for the e¢cacy of a variety of policy prescriptions; but
here we just focus on the set of policies investigated for this model, to illustrate
the power of our methods.
I will discuss the models properties with these policies in a moment. But
rst let me note that we can test it two ways- by a Likelihood Ratio test for
three key macro variables, ination, output and interest rates and also by an
Indirect Inference test on the same three variables. I choose these because
they are focused on the behaviour of the three variables of interest to us as
policymakers. The LR test measures how close the model gets to the data-
essentially a forecasting test; notice at once that this not really our interest but
we are using it as a general specication test. It turns out that the LR test
is not sensitive, at least for the SW model, with what variables are included
in the test, no doubt becase if a model forecasts some variables well, it must
be forecasting the other variables well that are closely linked to them. The II
test looks at how close the model gets to these three variables data behaviour-
which we are deeply interested in matching and represent by a VECM (which
we rewrite as a VARX) here as the data is non-stationary. Thus with the II test
we have carefully chosen its focus to match our policy interests; we could have
chosen a broader group of variables which would have raised the test power
but at the cost of possibly not nding a model that would t their broader
behaviour. Thus we see here that the focus of the test is a crucial aspect of the
II test.
I will discuss the models properties with these policies in a moment. But
rst notice that we can test it two ways- by a Likelihood Ratio test for three
key macro variables, ination, output and interest rates and also by an IIW
test on the same three variables. We choose these because they are focused on
the behaviour of the three variables of interest to us as policymakers. The LR
test measures how close the model gets to the data- essentially a forecasting
test; notice at once that this not really our interest but we are using it as a
general specication test. It turns out that the LR test is not sensitive, at
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least for the SW model, to what variables are included in the test, no doubt
becase if a model forecasts some variables well, it must be forecasting the other
variables well that are closely linked to them. We carry out the LR test in the
usual way, allowing the s to be reestimated on the error processes extracted by
LIML. The IIW test looks at how close the model gets to these three variables
data behaviour- which we are deeply interested in matching and represent by
a VECM (which we rewrite as a VARX) here as the data is non-stationary.
Thus with the IIW test we have carefully chosen its focus to match our policy
interests; we could have chosen a broader group of variables which would have
raised the test power but at the cost of possibly not nding a model that would
t their broader behaviour. Thus we see here that the focus of the test is a
crucial aspect of the IIW test.
I now reproduce some Monte Carlo experiments for the SW model from
Table ??, ?? above:
Percent Mis-specied Wald LR Wald LR
Stationary data Non-stationary data
True 5:0 5:0 5:0 5:0
1 19:8 6:3 7:9 5:2
3 52:1 8:8 49:2 5:8
5 87:3 13:1 97:8 6:2
7 99:4 21:6 100:0 7:4
10 100:0 53:4 100:0 9:6
15 100:0 99:3 100:0 15:6
20 100:0 99:7 100:0 26:5
Table 3: Rejection Rates for Wald and Likelihood Ratio for 3 Variable VAR(1)
The basic point I want to emphasise from this comparison is that if this model
passes the IIW test, we can be sure it is less than 7% False whereas if it passes
the LR test we can only be sure it is less than 15% False under stationarised
data; under non-stationary data, the relevant case here, we cannot even be sure
it is less than 20% False- in fact we nd that it requires the model to be as much
as 50% False for it to be rejected roughly 100% of the time.
When we now apply the two tests to the Monetary model discussed above,
it passes both tests. We can now compare how our policy analysis would vary
with the two test approaches.
Our basic policy results when we treat the model as True are summarised
in the rst row of the following Table 4:
If we use the IIW test we know that our model could be up to 7% False but
no more. We can discover the e¤ect of this degree of Falseness on our policy
results by redoing the whole policy exercise with the parameters disturbed by
7%. We obtain the results shown in the second row of Table 4.
In investigating the power of the test, we have simply assumed that we are
presented with a False set of parameters somehow from the estimation process.
We can then ask what power can we have against a quite mis-specied model
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Frequency of crisis Base Monetary PLT NGDPT PLT+ NGDPT+
(expected crises per 1000 years) case Reform Mon.Reform Mon.Reform
Policy exercise
when model is True 20:8 6:62 2:15 1:83 1:41 1:31
when model is 7% False 57:4 18:6 10:3 8:7 11:8 10:3
when model is 15% False 63:6 Explosive 19:4 19:6 19:4 17:4
when model is 50% False 70:4 Explosive 33:3 33:4 34:4 34:2
Notes:
Base Case: monetary policies as estimated over the sample period;
Monetary Reform: running a Monetary Base rule targeted on the credit premium side by side with a Taylor Rule;
PLT:substituting Price Level Target for Ination Target in Taylor Rule;
NGDPT: substituting Nominal GDP target for ination and output targets in Taylor Rule.
Table 4: Policy analysis when model have varying falseness
whose parameters are simply di¤erent. We have looked at this for the model
here, by asking what the power is against a quite di¤erent model- say a New
Classical model versus as assumed True SW model. The power is 100%; it is
always rejected. So we can be quite sure the True model is not something quite
di¤erent.
Between these two things we therefore have a lot of reassurance. First, if the
model is not well-specied, it will certainly be rejected. Second, if the model
is well-specied, then models up to 7% distant from it could be True; and our
policy conclusions can be tested for robustness within this range as we have
done here.
If we use the LR test we know the model could be up to 50% False- we
cannot guarantee to reject a model that is less false than this. For example a
15% False model will be rejected only a third of the time. If we now redo the
exercise for a 15% disturbance to the parameters we obtain the third row of
Table 4. Now our policy is plainly vulnerable. The frequency of crises under
the current regime goes up to once every 15 years; with NGDPT+monetary
reform it only comes down to once every 50-60 years. This is on the borderline
of acceptability.
If we look at the 50% false case, shown in the last row of Table 4, it is
disastrous. First, only just under half of the bootstrap simulations have sensible
solutions. If we take those that do, we can see that the prevalence of crises under
the existing regime would be much greater, at one every 14 years. As with 15%
False the monetary reform regime is explosive. The other regimes all generate
crisis frequency of around one every 30 years which is far from acceptable.
To make matters worse, we have seen that the LR test has virtually no power
against model misspecication, so that we cannot be sure that a misspecied
model with yet other, possibly even worse, results might be at work.
What this is showing us is that according to the LR test versions of our model
that could be true imply much higher frequency of crises than in the estimated
case and the monetary policy regimes suggested as improvements could either
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give explosive results or produce an improvement in the crisis frequency that is
quite inadequate for policy purposes. In other words the policymaker cannot
rely on the model policy results. But using the IIW test we can be sure that
the recommended policies will deliver the results we claim.
3.1 Can Estimation protect us against Falseness?
But would this vulnerability not be reduced if we take ML estimation seriously?
Unfortunately, we have found fromMonte Carlo experiments with the SWmodel
that estimation by ML gives us no guarantees of getting close to the true para-
meters. It is well-known to be a highly biased estimator in small samples- with
an average absolute estimation bias across all parameters of nearly 9% in our
Monte Carlo experiments- see Table5. Bearing in mind that our falseness mea-
sure assumes x as the absolute bias, alternating plus and minus, this suggests
that FIML will on average give us this degree of falseness; in any particular
sample it could be much larger therefore.
We also looked above at whether the Indirect Inference estimator could give
us any guarantees in this respect. This estimator was much less biased in small
samples, with an average absolute bias about half that of FIML- see Table5.
However, again this can give us no guarantees of the accuracy of the estimates
in any particular sample.
Mean Bias (%) Absolute Mean Bias (%)
Starting coef II FIML II FIML
Steady-state elasticity of capital adjustment ' 5:74  0:900 5:297 0:900 5:297
Elasticity of consumption c 1:38  5:804  7:941 5:804 7:941
External habit formation  0:71  13:403  21:240 13:403 21:240
Probability of not changing wages w 0:70  0:480  3:671 0:480 3:671
Elasticity of labour supply L 1:83 0:759  8:086 0:759 8:086
Probability of not changing prices p 0:66  1:776 0:027 1:776 0:027
Wage indexation w 0:58  0:978 6:188 0:978 6:188
Price indexation p 0:24 0:483 3:228 0:483 3:228
Elasticity of capital utilisation  0:54  13:056  29:562 13:056 29:562
Share of xed costs in production (+1)  1:50  1:590 2:069 1:590 2:069
Taylor Rule response to ination rp 2:04 7:820 2:815 7:820 2:815
Interest rate smoothing  0:81  0:843  0:089 0:843 0:089
Taylor Rule response to output ry 0:08  4:686  29:825 4:686 29:825
Taylor Rule response to change in output ry 0:22  5:587 0:171 5:587 0:171
Average  2:861  5:758 4:155 8:586
Table 5: Small Sample Estimation Bias Comparison (II v. LR)
It follows that we are essentially reliant on the power of the test, in the sense
that this can guarantee that our model is both well specied and no more than
7% false under indirect inference, because if it were either it would have been
rejected with complete certainty.
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The dimension in which we have carried out this examination of the models
reliability in the face of what we might call general falseness. It may be also
that the models performance is sensitive to the values of one or two particular
parameters and if so we would also need to focus on the extent to which these
might be false, how far the tests power can protect us against this and how
sensitive the model is within this range. This further investigation can be carried
out in essentially the same way as the one we have illustrated with general
falseness. I should emphasise that the calculations done above should be redone
carefully with Monte Carlo power experiments with the same model and data
as are being used for the policy analysis; above, for purposes of illustration only,
the power estimates are taken from an earlier version of the SW model.
3.2 Choosing the testing procedure
Thus what I have tried to illustrate in this last section is how macro models
can be estimated and tested by a user with a particular purpose in mind. The
dilemma a user faces is the trade-o¤ between test power (i.e. the robustness to
being false of a model that marginally passes the test) and model tractability
(i.e. the relevance for the facts to be explained of a model that marginally passes
the test). Di¤erent testing procedures give di¤erent trade-o¤s as we have seen
and is illustrated in the gure below. Thus the Full Wald test gives the greatest
power; but a model that passes this test will have to reect the full complexity of
detailed behaviour and thus be highly intractable. At the other extreme the LR
test is easy to pass for a simple and tractable model; but the test has very low
power. In between lie Wald statistics with increasing narrowness of focus as
we move away from the Full Wald. These o¤er lower power in return for higher
tractability- somewhere along their trade-o¤ will be chosen by the policymaker,
as shown in Figure ?? below.
In order for us to nd a tractable model we have to allow a degree of falseness
in the model with respect to the data features other than those the policymaker
prizes. The way to do this is to choose an indirect Inference test that focuses
tightly (in a directed way) on the features of the data that are relevant to our
modelling purposes.
To apply these methods it is necessary to a) estimate and test the model,
b) assess which directed test to choose, c) assess the power in the case of
the model being used. We have programmes to do these things which we are
making available freely to users- Appendix 2 shows the steps involved in nding
the Wald statistic, as carried out in these programmes2 .
It follows that we are essentially reliant on the power of the test, in the sense
that this can guarantee that our model is both well specied and no more than
7% false under indirect inference, because if it were either it would have been
rejected with complete certainty.
2Programmes to implement the methods described in this paper can be downloaded freely
and at no cost from www.patrickminford.net/indirectinference.
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Figure 6: Maximising Friedman utility
4 Conclusions
I have tried to explain today how users of macro models can once again, as in
a bygone era, test their models by classical means, with a view to determining
if they can be used reliably for their specied policy purposes. For these users I
believe this is of great benet, since without this they are condemned to a high
degree of uncertainty about their models- assuming that they use calibration or
Bayesian methods, as is widespread. I have also shown that of the classical tests
available, Likelihood Ratio testing (and related tests using out-of-sample fore-
casts) have quite weak power, which makes it di¢cult to determine a models
reliability. Here in Cardi¤ we have developed an estimation and testing proce-
dure using Indirect Inference which o¤ers substantial power even when focused
narrowly on the objects of interest for policymakers as in Friedmans original
suggestions. This power enables policymakers to determine the bounds within
which their model will work and the robustness therefore of their policies. I have
given an example of policies proposed for use with the Smets-Wouters model as
adapted for the latest decades and how they can be shown to be highly robust.
I have ended by making available a suite of programmes (INDIRECT) that
will enable users to apply these methods exibly and easily to their particular
models and modelling uses.
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